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O P I N I O N 
____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge:  
Although we generally rely on jurors to follow a court’s 
instructions, we cannot expect the superhuman from them.  
Under certain circumstances, jurors cannot practically be 
expected to follow instructions, no matter how clear or explicit.  
The classic example arises during a joint criminal trial, in 
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which one defendant has confessed to the crime and the 
confession implicates his co-defendant.  The confession is 
admitted into evidence, and the jury is instructed to ignore the 
confession as evidence against the co-defendant.  This asks the 
impossible of our jurors.  In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 
123 (1968), the Supreme Court held that in these circumstances 
we cannot rely on a juror’s ability to put such an inculpatory 
statement out of their minds.  Therefore, its admission violates 
the non-confessing co-defendant’s rights under the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and requires a 
new trial if he has been prejudiced by such damaging evidence.  
More than fifty years after Bruton, despite intervening court 
opinions decrying this situation, courts still confront this 
problem. 
 
Here, petitioner Arthur Johnson and his co-defendant, 
Tyrone Wright, were charged with the murder of Donnie 
Skipworth, who was shot multiple times while dealing drugs in 
North Philadelphia.  Prior to trial, co-defendant Wright 
confessed to his involvement in the crime.  Wright’s 
confession also implicated Johnson by identifying him as the 
shooter.  The prosecution introduced Wright’s confession 
during trial, substituting Johnson’s name with “the other guy” 
in an attempt to avoid a Sixth Amendment Confrontation 
Clause violation.  However, repeated missteps and mistakes 
made it increasingly clear to the jury that Johnson was indeed 
“the other guy.”  The trial court instructed the jury to ignore 
Wright’s confession when considering Johnson’s culpability, 
but a question from the jury indicated that they were having 
great difficulty doing so.  Johnson was convicted of first-
degree murder after six days of deliberation.   
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Johnson appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court, which ruled that there was no Bruton violation 
since the substitution of “the other guy,” along with the trial 
court’s instruction, was adequate to protect Johnson’s Sixth 
Amendment rights under the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
precedent in Commonwealth v. Travers, 768 A.2d 845 (Pa. 
2001).  After the state court proceedings concluded, Johnson 
sought habeas relief in the District Court.  The District Court 
concluded that a Bruton violation had occurred and that the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court’s ruling to the contrary was an 
unreasonable application of federal law.  However, the District 
Court denied habeas relief because it concluded that the Bruton 
error was harmless.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
reverse the District Court’s judgment and grant Johnson’s 
petition for habeas relief.1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 
and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  
Our review over the District Court’s denial of Johnson’s 
habeas petition is plenary because the District Court did not 
hold an evidentiary hearing.  See Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 
105, 113 (3d Cir. 2009).  
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I. SIXTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION2 
 
We will first discuss Bruton and the legal principles at 
play, and then apply those principles in the context of this case.  
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees 
a criminal defendant’s right to be “confronted with the 
witnesses against him.”  U.S. Const. amend. VI.  This includes 
the ability to cross-examine witnesses.  See Pointer v. 
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404, 406–07 (1965).  When a non-
testifying co-defendant’s statement is introduced, it is in effect 
the testimony of a witness who cannot be cross-examined.  
Three Supreme Court cases—Bruton; Richardson v. 
Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987); and Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 
185 (1998)—establish the relevant controlling precedent.  We 
discuss each in turn. 
 
In Bruton, the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s 
right to confrontation is violated when a non-testifying co-
defendant’s confession is introduced in a joint trial, and that 
confession implicates the other defendant.  The Court held that 
even when the trial court clearly instructs the jury not to 
consider the statement against the non-confessing defendant, it 
                                                          
2 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)–(e), requires that we “afford 
considerable deference to state courts’ legal and factual 
determinations.”  Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 391–92 
(3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).  As a general matter, we 
apply AEDPA deference to the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s 
analysis under Bruton unless the decision was “contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).   
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“cannot accept limiting instructions as an adequate substitute 
for petitioner’s constitutional right of cross-examination.”  391 
U.S. at 137.  When such “powerfully incriminating 
extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused 
side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before 
the jury in a joint trial,” practically speaking, it is as though 
“there had been no instruction at all.”  Id. at 135–36, 137.  In 
this context, “the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow 
instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital 
to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the 
jury system cannot be ignored.”  Id. at 135. 
 
The Supreme Court clarified Bruton’s reach in 
Richardson, holding that no constitutional violation exists 
where a confession is redacted to eliminate “not only the 
defendant’s name, but any reference to his or her existence.”  
481 U.S. at 211.  In those cases, a limiting instruction “may 
well be successful” since there is not the “overwhelming 
probability” that the jury will be unable to disregard the 
inculpatory confession against the defendant.  Id. at 208.  The 
Richardson Court expressed “no opinion” on whether a 
confession is admissible when a defendant’s name is replaced 
with a “symbol or neutral pronoun.”  Id. at 211 n.5.  The 
Supreme Court refined the acceptable parameters of a redacted 
confession in Gray, holding that redactions cannot be so 
ineffectual that they actually could signal to the jury that the 
co-defendant’s name was deleted.  Such obvious redactions are 
“similar enough to Bruton’s unredacted confessions as to 
warrant the same legal results.”  523 U.S. at 195. 
 
While using a neutral pronoun may satisfy Bruton in 
some circumstances, we have clearly stated that courts should 
not apply a bright-line rule that such use will never violate 
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Bruton.  Bruton and its progeny require courts to take a holistic 
approach when considering redacted confessions, by viewing 
the redaction in the context of the entire record.  See 
Washington v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 801 F.3d 160, 167 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (“It is not enough to say that because there were 
redactions of [the defendants’] names that the rules 
from Bruton and Gray do not apply.”); United States v. 
Hardwick, 544 F.3d 565, 573 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he nature of 
the linkage between the redacted statement and the other 
evidence in the record is vitally important in determining 
whether a defendant’s Confrontation Clause right has been 
violated.”).   
 
Here, Johnson and Wright were on trial together.  The 
prosecution alleged that Wright drove the getaway car and 
Johnson and Abbas Parker approached Donnie Skipworth and 
opened fire.  Abbas Parker (“Baz”) was not on trial.3  The trial 
court permitted Detective James Burns, who took Wright’s 
confession, to read it to the jury over defense counsel’s 
objections, substituting Johnson’s name with “the other guy” 
or another neutral pronoun, as italicized below:  
 
Wright:  I was driving down Master Street 
and I seen some guy. He was 
walking down Master right by 
Newkirk. He flagged us down and 
I pulled over. Then he opened up 
my side door and was standing 
there talking to us. He said that he 
seen Donnie up on Thompson 
                                                          
3 The record does not contain any information regarding any 
prosecution of Abbas Parker.   
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Street and he was going to go up 
and talk to him.  Baz was like, I’m 
a walk up with you. Baz got out of 
the van and spoke with him and 
then he says to me, yoh, meet us 
around on 28th and Thompson 
Street. Then he and Baz walked up 
Newkirk Street and I pulled off. I 
drove up Dover Street to Jefferson 
and then down 28th Street and 
pulled over at Thompson, across 
the street from the firehouse.  I shut 
the engine off and waited. I was 
probably there for a minute or two 
when I heard the gunshots coming 
from around the corner  
. . . . I seen Baz come running 
around the corner. He jumps in the 
van and starts yelling, we out, we 
out, we out, pull off. I pulled off 
and drove down 28th Street.  
. . .  
Burns: Did Baz tell you that he shot 
Donnie? 
Wright:   No. He had a gun, but all he said 
was that the other guy shot Donnie. 
. . .  
Burns:   Did you know if the other guy had 
a gun that night?  
Wright:   Yeah. I seen him with it right 
before the shooting down on 
Master Street. When I pulled up to 
him on Master, he was standing at 
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my sliding door and had his hands 
up on the roof of the van talking. 
He had the gun stuck in his pants 
and I could see it. It was a black 
semi auto with lines on the back of 
the grip, like grooves cut in the 
back of the grip. He always has 
that gun. . . .  
Burns:   Do you know why the other guy 
wanted to talk to Donnie? 
Wright:   No, but I found out the next day. . 
. . The whole neighborhood was 
talking about it. Everyone was 
saying that the other guy shot the 
boy over Donnie killing some boy 
named Nel two years ago on 
Newkirk Street. Nel was supposed 
to be his boy.  
 
A. 454–55.   
This situation is eerily reminiscent of the fact pattern in 
Vazquez v. Wilson, 550 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 2008).  There, the 
confessing co-defendant informed police that there were only 
two possible shooters: the non-confessing co-defendant and a 
third person not on trial.  During trial, the two co-conspirators’ 
names were replaced with “my boy” and “the other guy.”  Id. 
at 274.  However, since the third person was not on trial and 
the prosecution argued the non-confessing defendant “fired the 
fatal shot,” we held that the jury was “almost certain” to 
identify the non-confessing defendant as the shooter.  Id. at 
281.  Like Vazquez, here, Wright’s confession identified Abbas 
Parker and an unnamed participant, and since Abbas Parker 
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was not on trial, the confession “sharply incriminated” 
Johnson, the only other person on trial.  United States v. 
Richards, 241 F.3d 335, 346 (3d Cir. 2001) (interpreting Gray 
and finding a Bruton error where the co-defendant’s confession 
referred to three people involved in the crime and the non-
confessing co-defendant was “only other person involved in 
the case”).  
 
The limited participants in this case made it obvious to 
a juror who “need only lift his eyes to [Johnson], sitting at 
counsel table,” to determine that he was “the other 
guy,” i.e. the shooter.  Gray, 523 U.S. at 193; see also Eley v. 
Erickson, 712 F.3d 837, 860–61 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding a 
Bruton violation where the non-testifying co-defendant’s 
confession “implicated exactly three people in the crimes and 
exactly three defendants appeared at the joint trial”); cf. 
Priester v. Vaughn, 382 F.3d 394, 401 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(substituting “the other guy” did not implicate the defendant 
because at least fifteen people were involved in the crime).  
Here, Wright’s confession left little doubt that the only other 
accused sitting at the table with Wright was “the other guy.”  
 
Johnson’s identity as the “other guy” was also explicitly 
revealed both at the beginning and the end of trial.  During 
opening statements, Wright’s attorney informed the jury that 
“Wright . . . writes down something to the effect of, oh, yes, I 
know that Arthur and Abbas went there to shoot Donnie 
Skipworth.”  A. 326.4  Johnson was again identified during 
                                                          
4 Objections to this outburst produced only confusing follow up 
in an attempt to undo the harm.  Indeed, in Vazquez, we 
expressed concern that “[o]nce the prosecutor made it clear to 
the jury that [the confessing co-defendant] had identified [the 
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closing arguments, when the prosecutor told the jury, 
“[Wright] tells you in his very own statement.  He tells you that 
he knows that Art is going to go around—excuse me—he 
knows Abbas . . . .”  A. 536.  
 
 If there was any doubt about Johnson’s identity as the 
shooter, after six days of deliberation, the jury sent a note to 
the trial judge: 
 
Your Honor, 
 
We the jurors have a question about your 
instruction regarding Tyrone Wright’s statement. 
You had instructed us that Tyrone Wright’s 
statement may only be used against Tyrone 
Wright and not against Arthur Johnson. We also 
recall the Commonwealth saying that we are not 
being asked to turn off our common sense. We 
would like to confirm that in order to comply 
with your instruction, we must not make any 
inferences stemming from the statement, or use 
the statement to help draw a more complete 
picture of the alleged crime in our minds when 
considering the case against Arthur Johnson. Our 
understanding is that our instruction is to push 
the statement from our minds and pretend it 
                                                          
non-confessing co-defendant] as the shooter the situation was 
no different than it would have been if [the confessing co-
defendant’s] unredacted statement directly implicating [the 
non-confessing co-defendant] as the shooter had been admitted 
into evidence or used from the outset of the case.”  Vazquez, 
550 F.3d at 283 n.14. 
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never existed when we are considering the case 
against Arthur Johnson. Is this correct? 
 
A. 555.  The judge responded to the question by reinstructing 
the jurors that they could not consider Wright’s statement 
against Johnson.  Reply Br. 6.   
 
The jury knew all too well that Johnson was the other 
guy.  There is no doubt that there was a clear violation under 
Bruton of Johnson’s Sixth Amendment rights and that the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court’s ruling was an unreasonable 
application of Bruton, Richardson, and Gray.  The jury was 
told that Johnson was the other guy on two separate occasions 
during the trial:  before the jury even heard the evidence and 
before the jury went into deliberations.  After these 
identifications, any attempts to conceal Johnson’s identity 
were futile; the cat was already out of the bag.  This is a clear 
Bruton violation and we could end our analysis there.   
 
 As the above analysis shows, Wright’s redacted 
confession alone would have violated Bruton and the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court should have so found.  Instead, 
the Superior Court found the substitution of the “other guy” 
equivalent to the use of a neutral pronoun and clearly erred 
when, focusing only on the confession, it concluded that under 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s precedent in Travers, 768 
A.2d at 851 (holding that no Bruton violation existed where the 
redacted confession substituted the non-confessing co-
defendant’s name with a neutral pronoun), there was no Bruton 
violation.  The Superior Court wrote the following:  
 
The [Travers] Court concluded that the use of a 
neutral pronoun was [an] acceptable means of 
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alleviating the Sixth Amendment problem 
because it is “not an obvious alteration at all” as 
compared to an obvious deletion of the 
defendant’s name with nothing to take its place.  
 
In the instant matter, the Commonwealth 
introduced Wright’s confession referring to 
Johnson as “some other guy,” “some guy,” 
“him,” “he,” or “the other guy.”  The trial court 
twice instructed the jury that Wright’s 
confession was not admissible against Johnson, 
once before the statement’s admission and once 
during the jury charge.  Thus, the facts of the 
instant matter are precisely in line with Travers. 
Since Johnson’s argument runs counter to 
binding Supreme Court precedent, it fails.  
 
A. 205 (citations omitted).  The Superior Court’s analysis is 
devoid of any substantive discussion of the redacted confession 
within the context of the five-day trial.  We agree with the 
District Court that the Superior Court’s determination was an 
unreasonable application of federal law.  
 
II. PREJUDICE ANALYSIS 
 
Having concluded that the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
unreasonably applied federal law, we will next assess whether 
the Bruton error had a “substantial and injurious effect or 
influence in determining the jury’s verdict”—i.e., if it requires 
reversal.  Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993) 
(citation omitted).  Brecht requires a finding of “actual 
prejudice,” which is “more than a reasonable possibility that 
the error was harmful.”  Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2197–
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98 (2016) (citation omitted).  But reviewing courts need not be 
certain that a Bruton error affected the jury, and indeed, the 
Supreme Court has “acknowledge[d] the impossibility” of such 
a determination.  Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135.  Habeas relief must 
be granted whenever there is “grave doubt” as to the 
harmlessness of the error.  O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 
436 (1995).  In assessing grave doubt, the Supreme Court has 
cautioned “that the uncertain judge should treat the error, not 
as if it were harmless, but as if it affected the verdict.”  Id. at 
435.  If the matter is “so evenly balanced” that we are in 
“virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the error,” we must 
resolve that balance in favor of the petitioner.  Id.   
 
The Supreme Court has instructed reviewing courts to 
consider a “host of factors” in their harmlessness analysis, 
including:  
 
the importance of the witness’[s] testimony in 
the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony 
was cumulative, the presence or absence of 
evidence corroborating or contradicting the 
testimony of the witness on material points, the 
extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, 
and, of course, the overall strength of the 
prosecution’s case. 
 
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986).5  In 
framing our analysis, our role is not to question whether the 
                                                          
5 We have previously applied these factors in assessing the 
harmlessness of a Bruton error under AEDPA, reviewing for 
whether a state court unreasonably applied Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).  See Johnson v. Lamas, 850 
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evidence could support a guilty verdict, but “rather, even so, 
whether the error itself had substantial influence.”  Kotteakos 
v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946); see also O’Neal, 
513 U.S. at 436–37.  “If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the 
conviction cannot stand.”  Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765. 
 
The District Court did not conduct an evidentiary 
hearing, so our review of its harmlessness determination is 
plenary.  See Thomas, 570 F.3d at 113.  Since the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court denied relief without addressing harmlessness, 
we conduct our harmless error review de novo.  See Collins v. 
Sec’y of the Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 742 F.3d 528, 544 (3d Cir. 
2014); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2001); cf. Fry 
v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119 (2007) (“[W]hen a state court 
determines that a constitutional violation is harmless, a federal 
court may not award habeas relief under § 2254 unless the 
harmlessness determination itself was unreasonable.”) 
(emphasis in original).  Under this lens, we will review the trial 
evidence in detail.  
 
A. Properly Admitted Evidence 
At around midnight on May 4, 2008, Donnie Skipworth 
was shot multiple times on the 1300 block of Newkirk Street 
in North Philadelphia.  The Commonwealth charged Johnson 
and Wright with murder based on witness statements and 
forensic evidence.  The trial began on January 28, 2010, and 
the testimony unfolded over five days.   
 
                                                          
F.3d 119, 133 (3d Cir. 2017).  We find these factors for 
assessing harmlessness equally applicable 
when Brecht provides our standard of review. 
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The jury knew that Johnson was “the other guy” in 
Wright’s confession before the prosecution even began its 
case-in-chief.  During opening statements, Wright’s attorney 
told the jury that Wright said Johnson and Abbas Parker went 
to Newkirk Street to shoot Donnie Skipworth.  Immediately 
afterwards, the prosecution called its first witness, Aaron 
Taylor.  
 
Taylor grew up in North Philadelphia on the 1500 block 
of Newkirk Street.  He had known Johnson and Donnie for a 
few years while growing up in the neighborhood, however at 
the time of trial, Taylor had not lived there for over ten years.  
One month after the shooting, Taylor was arrested on drug 
charges and taken into police custody.  Taylor was later 
transported to the homicide unit, where he was interviewed by 
Detective George Fetters about the circumstances surrounding 
Donnie’s death.  Taylor then signed a police statement 
implicating Johnson in the shooting.  The statement included 
the following:   
 
Look, I was down there on Newkirk like one or 
two weeks after Donnie was killed and I heard 
this young boy, Art, talking about how he did it, 
he killed Donnie, and how nobody had to worry 
about what [Donnie] had done to Darnell.  See, 
Artie is supposed to be cousins somehow with 
Darnell and he said he would get Donnie for 
what he did to his cousin, Darnell.   
 
A. 334.  Taylor “guessed” as to the purported conflict between 
Donnie and Darnell, supplying a motive for Johnson to seek 
retribution for Darnell’s murder:  
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The word was that Donnie got [Darnell] killed. 
This was about one and a half to two years ago 
on the same block. See, they was selling drugs 
together out there, and I guess that Darnell got 
big headed and Donnie didn’t like it.  So the 
word was that he (Donnie) had somebody kill 
Darnell. I guess it was over the money that they 
were making out there. You see, Donnie was 
always the pretty boy type and Darnell was the 
muscle, and I guess they just got in each other’s 
way.   
 
A. 333.  At trial, Taylor unequivocally denied his entire 
statement to the police and testified that he was “forced 
into a statement.”  A. 330.  Taylor said he knew nothing 
about Darnell’s death and never overheard Johnson say 
that he killed Donnie out of revenge for killing Darnell.  
In fact, at the time of the statement, Taylor said he had 
moved away from the neighborhood and had not  
seen Johnson in years.   
The prosecution next called Detective Fetters, who 
testified about his interview with Taylor.  Fetters said that in 
June 2008, Taylor voluntarily approached the police, stating 
that he had information about Donnie’s death.  Fetters said that 
Taylor was cooperative during the interview, and that Taylor 
had voluntarily signed his police statement.  Fetters never 
asked Taylor why he was providing the statement, but 
suspected that Taylor did so under the belief that he would 
receive help on his pending drug charges.   
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To provide further context for Taylor’s police 
statement, the prosecution next called Detective Theodore 
Hagan, the homicide detective who investigated Darnell’s 
murder in 2005.  However, Hagan’s testimony contradicted 
Taylor’s account of Johnson’s motive for killing Donnie.  Not 
only did Hagan say Donnie was never implicated in Darnell’s 
murder, he also said that Donnie had actually helped the police 
identify Darnell’s shooter.  After Darnell’s death, Donnie 
voluntarily approached the police to provide an eyewitness 
statement, which then helped police identify and arrest the 
shooter, Eric Weedon. Eric Weedon pled guilty to shooting 
Darnell.  Hagan also said that Donnie would have been called 
to testify as an eyewitness to Darnell’s murder had the case 
gone to trial. 
 
The prosecution also called two firefighters, Fire 
Lieutenant Benny Hutchins and Firefighter Terence Banks, 
who were on duty at a nearby station the night of the shooting. 
The station, Engine Company 34, is located on the corner of 
28th Street and Thompson Street, about one block away from 
the shooting.  The two firefighters’ testimony mirrored each 
other.  Hutchins and Banks both testified that, a few minutes 
after midnight on May 4, 2008, they heard multiple gunshots 
from a nearby location and noticed a minivan idling in front of 
the station on the southwest corner of 28th Street and 
Thompson Street.  Shortly after hearing the gunshots, Hutchins 
and Banks observed a man walking east on Thompson Street, 
away from Newkirk Street.  The man crossed Thompson Street 
onto 28th Street and entered the passenger side of the minivan.  
The minivan immediately left. 
 
Hutchins testified that the man was holding a firearm in 
his right hand.  Banks also testified that the man appeared to 
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be holding a firearm.  Hutchins described the man as having a 
“slender build” and Banks described him as “thin.”  A. 382, 
392.  They both confirmed that Johnson was neither thin nor 
slender, implying that Johnson was not the man they saw the 
night of the shooting.   
 
Within one minute of the shooting, Hutchins and Banks 
arrived at the scene, and gave first aid to Donnie Skipworth, 
who was lying on the sidewalk about thirty or forty feet away 
from the fire station.  Hutchins testified that he was the first 
one on the scene.  Throughout this time, Hutchins did not see 
anyone else walking away from Newkirk Street.  
 
After the firefighters’ testimony, the prosecution called 
its only eyewitness, the victim’s brother, Dion Skipworth.  
Dion testified that on the night of May 4, 2008, he was selling 
drugs with his brother Donnie and their two cousins on the 
1300 block of Newkirk Street.  Dion and Donnie routinely sold 
drugs on Newkirk Street and that night was no exception.  After 
selling drugs for about six hours, Dion said he saw Johnson 
walking towards them from the 1200 block of Newkirk Street.  
Dion and Johnson had grown up in the same neighborhood and 
were friends prior to the shooting.  That night, Dion assumed 
that Johnson would simply walk past them because he 
“[f]igured he was going through nothing, so whatever reason 
to think anything else.”  A. 402.  According to Dion, Johnson 
walked directly up to Donnie and shot him.  Dion testified that 
Johnson was by himself when he walked up and began 
shooting.  He also said that he had no knowledge that Parker or 
Wright were involved with the shooting.  
  
After the shooting started, Dion testified that he and his 
cousins fled, running north on Newkirk Street to his cousin’s 
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nearby home.  Returning to the scene five to ten minutes later, 
Dion saw Donnie lying on the ground with bullet holes through 
his jeans and jacket.  In direct contradiction to Hutchins’ 
testimony, Dion said that he was the first person on the scene 
and there were no firemen there.  Dion testified: 
 
Q: Well, paramedics are already out there. The   
     whole neighborhood is out by that time, aren’t   
     they? 
A: Not really. 
Q: So you mean to tell me the firemen aren’t  
     there when you come back ten minutes later? 
A: No. 
. . .  
Q: So you were the first person there before any  
    police came on the scene? 
A: Yes.  
 
A. 413.   
Dion also offered background information on the 
dynamics between himself and other individuals in the 
neighborhood.  Dion said that Parker, Wright, and Johnson 
were close friends and spent nearly every day together prior to 
the shooting.  Dion said that he was related to Parker through 
marriage and had known Parker his entire life.  Dion had also 
been friends with Wright for years throughout middle and high 
school.  Dion further testified that there had been no animosity 
or conflict between Donnie and Johnson.  Dion testified as 
follows: 
 
Q: You never had any problem, you and your  
     brother, with [Johnson] over in the 
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     neighborhood, did you? 
   A: No.  
   Q: Or any business, did you? 
   A: No. 
 
A. 409.  He later continued: 
 
Q: You were asked if you knew any reason why  
     Arthur would shoot your brother and you said   
     no; is that correct? 
A: Correct. 
Q: There was nothing about no retaliation about 
     any kind of murder, was    
     there? 
A: No.  
 
A. 413.  He again confirmed that there were no issues 
with Johnson: 
 
Q: And there is no drama going on between 
     Arthur and the Skipworths or anything else? 
A: No.  
 
A. 417.  Thus, Taylor’s statement regarding Johnson’s motive 
for killing Donnie was questionable.   
 
Dion’s testimony was impeached several times.  First, 
Dion did not approach law enforcement until three months 
after the shooting, explaining that he did so out of fear because 
“snitches get killed” in his neighborhood.  A. 405.  However, 
cross-examination revealed that his reasons for delay were 
inconsistent.  At trial, Dion testified that he did not come to the 
police because he was going to kill Johnson himself, yet at the 
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preliminary hearing, Dion said he needed time to cope with his 
loss.   
 
Second, Dion was impeached with testimony via 
stipulation from Officer Victoria Lozada, the responding 
officer to the scene on the night of the shooting.  Dion testified 
that none of the responding officers questioned him that night.  
However, Officer Lozada reported the opposite.  In an 
interview with the homicide unit the morning after the 
shooting, Officer Lozada said, “I spoke to Dion Skipworth.  He 
identified himself as the victim’s brother.  He had told me that 
he had seen his brother at the scene and he gave me all the 
identifiers concerning the victim.  He also stated that he did not 
see the shooting, nor was he with him.”  A. 511–12.  
 
Third, Dion denied previously speaking with Detective 
Burns, the officer who interviewed him at length about the 
shooting when Dion came into the station.  However, Burns 
told a different story.  Burns testified that he had previously 
interviewed Dion in 2006 for a different homicide 
investigation.  He said that Dion was cooperative during the 
initial 2006 interview but refused to cooperate with police once 
that case went to trial.  Dion repeatedly denied his involvement 
in the 2006 homicide investigation. 
 
The prosecution did not call any other witnesses to 
corroborate Dion’s testimony. Dion testified that his two 
cousins, Jermaine and Larry, were present during the shooting, 
and stood next to Donnie as Johnson walked up and shot him.  
However, the prosecution did not call Jermaine or Larry to 
testify.  Dion also said that the day after the shooting, he told 
his brother, Doug, and the rest of his cousins that he saw 
Johnson shoot and kill Donnie.  Again, the prosecution did not 
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call any of those people to corroborate Dion’s testimony.  The 
prosecution argues that other testimony introduced at trial 
corroborated Dion’s testimony, however we find this 
testimony vague and inconclusive.6   
 
The prosecution presented no physical evidence that 
directly implicated Johnson in the shooting.  At the close of 
trial, the jury was instructed and then proceeded to deliberate 
for six days.   
 
B. Strength of the Evidence 
 
We next evaluate the strength of the prosecution’s 
evidence against Johnson.  The Commonwealth argues that 
Wright’s confession could not have affected the jury because 
it was cumulative of other overwhelming evidence.  We find 
this argument unavailing, as the prosecution’s two key 
witnesses were substantially impeached and their testimony 
was contradicted through other witness testimony.  Far from 
duplicative, Wright’s confession served to improperly 
corroborate their less-than-credible testimony, making it more 
                                                          
6 The medical examiner, Dr. Samuel Gulino, testified that a 
total of seven bullets entered Donnie’s body, in addition to a 
graze wound and several shrapnel wounds.  The wounds 
showed no evidence of close-range firing.  Ballistics expert 
Kenneth Lay testified that the cartridge cases collected from 
the scene indicated that they were fired from either a Glock or 
Smith & Wesson Sigma type pistol.  Three bullets were 
removed from Donnie’s body, but the evidence was 
inconclusive as to whether there were bullets fired from a 
revolver and a Glock, or possibly also a third gun. 
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likely that the jury would set aside their doubts in favor of a 
conviction.  
i. Eyewitness Testimony  
 
Although Dion Skipworth’s eyewitness testimony 
would present strong inculpatory evidence on its own, his 
testimony suffered from significant credibility issues which we 
cannot overlook.  The Commonwealth argues that Dion’s 
three-month delay stemmed from a fear of being targeted in his 
neighborhood, however this does not address the other 
substantial flaws in his testimony, including its inconsistency 
with his prior statements and conflict with the accounts of 
Detective Burns and Officer Lozada.   
 
Dion’s account of the shooting was also called into 
question.  The firefighters’ testimony suggested that there was 
a second shooter: the thin man holding a gun who fled the scene 
and entered a white minivan.  We know from Wright’s 
confession that the thin man was Abbas Parker, who was with 
Johnson during the shooting, and that Wright was the person 
driving the minivan.  Yet Dion’s account of the shooting placed 
only Johnson at the scene, and Dion alleges that he had no 
knowledge of Parker’s involvement, to whom Dion is related 
through marriage.  The prosecution’s theory that there were 
two shooters—Parker firing a revolver and Johnson firing a 
Glock—contradicted Dion’s description of Johnson alone 
casually walking and opening fire at Donnie.  And Dion did 
not see the firemen who were clearly at the scene after the 
shooting.  Lastly, the Commonwealth did not call any other 
witnesses to corroborate Dion’s account of the shooting, 
including Dion’s two cousins who, according to Dion, were 
standing next to Donnie when Johnson began shooting, or the 
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other family members whom Dion purportedly told that 
Johnson was the shooter the day after the shooting.   
 
ii. Evidence of Motive  
 
The Commonwealth relies heavily on Taylor’s police 
statement as having shown Johnson’s motive, and erroneously 
avers that Dion “testified about the history of animosity 
between Johnson and Donnie.”  Gov. Br. 27.  To the contrary, 
Taylor’s statement is not only unsupported by other record 
evidence, but also directly contradicted by other witnesses’ 
testimony.  Dion testified multiple times that there was no 
underlying conflict between Donnie and Johnson.  Detective 
Hagan testified that Donnie actually helped arrest and convict 
Darnell’s shooter, Eric Weedon, and provided valuable 
eyewitness information to the police.  These contradictions, 
combined with Taylor’s vehement denial of his police 
statement and incentive to lie to receive favorable treatment on 
his pending drug charges, could easily lead a jury to dismiss 
Taylor’s statement as the result of neighborhood gossip.   
 
The lack of overwhelming evidence against Johnson 
and the substantial flaws with the prosecution’s key witnesses 
leave us in grave doubt about the harmlessness of the error.  In 
Washington, we held that an improperly admitted confession 
created actual prejudice where the non-testifying co-
defendant’s confession, the source of the Bruton error, and a 
testifying co-conspirator both identified the defendant as the 
driver, but the testimony suffered from “significant credibility 
problems.”  801 F.3d at 171.  We held that the confession, 
when “viewed in tandem” with the witness’s “less-than-
credible statement,” had a “corroborative effect” that likely 
affected the jury’s verdict.  Id.  Similarly, we find that Wright’s 
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confession gave significant weight to Dion’s testimony that 
Johnson was the shooter and validated Taylor’s dubious police 
statement.7  This corroboration undercut Johnson’s effort to 
raise doubts about their less-than-credible testimony, and 
likely caused the jury to give it increased weight during 
deliberations.   
 
 iii. Comparison to Our Prior Case Law  
We disagree with the Commonwealth’s argument that 
our prior cases compel a harmless error finding here.  The 
Commonwealth relies heavily on Johnson v. Lamas, 850 F.3d 
119 (3d Cir. 2017), but there the prosecution presented two 
eyewitnesses whose identifications corroborated each other.  
We also applied a different standard of review in Lamas.  
There, we applied AEDPA deference to the state court’s ruling, 
and ultimately determined that the error was harmless “even if 
we might decide the case differently were we to undertake de 
novo review.”  Id. at 134.  Here we review the undecided issue 
of harmless error de novo, and the record shows that Dion and 
Taylor contradicted each other with respect to Johnson’s 
motive.   
 
We also do not find, as we did in Bond v. Beard, that the 
prosecution presented “such extensive evidence of [the 
petitioner’s] guilt that the error could not have had a substantial 
and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s 
verdict.” 539 F.3d 256, 276 (3d Cir. 2008).  In Bond, we held 
that the error “added little to this compelling evidence against 
                                                          
7 As in Washington, we are also cognizant of Wright’s 
“inherent incentive to minimize his own culpability as a 
participant in the events he described.”  801 F.3d at 171. 
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[the petitioner]” where the prosecution presented two 
eyewitnesses and the defendant had confessed to the police.  Id.  
Here, Johnson never confessed to the crime, the 
Commonwealth’s sole eyewitness had substantial flaws, other 
witnesses painted a picture different from that portrayed by 
Dion, and the jury deliberations suggest that this was a close 
case.  Indeed, “most of the ‘overwhelming’ evidence the State 
points to concerns the [crime] itself,” Adamson v. Cathel, 633 
F.3d 248, 260 (3d Cir. 2011), and how Donnie was shot, rather 
than evidence of who shot him.  A far cry from the 
overwhelming evidence against the defendant presented in 
Bond, we do not find that the evidence rendered Wright’s 
confession “of little moment.”  Adamson, 633 F.3d at 261. 
 
C. Jury Deliberations 
The jury deliberated for six full days before returning a 
verdict against Johnson.  On the first day of deliberations, the 
jury requested a copy of Wright’s confession, which the trial 
judge denied.  On the third day, the jury reached a verdict as to 
Wright, however were unable to do the same for Johnson.  The 
jury wrote the following note to the trial judge:  
 
At this point, we the jurors have reached a 
unanimous verdict with regard to the charges 
against Tyrone Wright.  After considerable 
deliberation, we have been unable to reach a 
unanimous verdict on the charges against Arthur 
Johnson. We respectfully request any 
suggestions or guidance you can provide us at 
this time.   
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A. 554.  After three additional days of deliberation, the jury 
sent its final note, seeking clarification as to whether they could 
consider Wright’s confession against Johnson, which we 
quoted above.  The jury returned its verdict convicting Johnson 
of first-degree murder that same day.  
 
The Commonwealth argues that its overwhelming 
evidence against Johnson rendered Wright’s confession of 
minimal value during deliberations.  We find this argument 
unconvincing.  The evidence was not overwhelming and, 
indeed, could be said to be in conflict and at least confusing.  
We join our sister circuits in holding that the length of jury 
deliberations may be one consideration in assessing the 
strength of the prosecution’s case.8  Here, we find the 
deliberation period considerable, particularly since it lasted 
                                                          
8 See Dugas v. Coplan, 428 F.3d 317, 335 (1st Cir. 2005) (“The 
length of jury deliberations can be one factor in determining 
how close the jury viewed the case to be.”); Dyas v. Poole, 317 
F.3d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he evidence against [the 
petitioner] was not overwhelming, a fact reflected in the length 
of the jury’s deliberations.”); United States v. Bubar, 567 F.2d 
192, 202 (2d Cir. 1977) (considering the length of jury 
deliberations to assess strength of the case); Dallago v. United 
States, 427 F.2d 546, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (“[O]ne would 
expect that if the evidence of guilt was overwhelming the jury 
would have succumbed much sooner.”); Osborne v. United 
States, 351 F.2d 111, 118 (8th Cir. 1965) (“The fact that the 
jury deliberated some sixteen hours, covering two full working 
days . . . lends credence to the view that the case was a close 
and a difficult one.”). 
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longer than the trial itself.9  This, coupled with the jury’s 
request for “guidance” as to the charges against Johnson on the 
third day, is a strong indication this case was a close call for 
the jury.  
 
The Commonwealth argues that the jury’s final note is 
evidence that it did not consider Wright’s statement “at all” 
against Johnson, since the note “expressly indicates that the 
jury adhered to the trial court’s instruction.”  Gov. Br. 34.  
While we agree that the note supports that the jury understood 
its instruction, Bruton plainly forbids any inference that the 
jury was able to follow it.  The contents of the note, which 
suggest that the jurors believed they must “turn off [their] 
common sense” in order to “pretend [Wright’s statement] 
never existed,” A. 555, epitomizes the sort of “mental 
gymnastic[s]” that Bruton cautioned against, 391 U.S. at 132 
n.8.  The note—which the jury sent on their sixth and final day 
of deliberations—suggests that Wright’s confession infected 
deliberations and further evinces a lack of overwhelming 
evidence.   
                                                          
9 Although we do not set a minimum threshold, here we note 
that six days of deliberation is particularly significant, when 
compared to other cases addressing this issue.  See, e.g., 
Thomas v. Chappell, 678 F.3d 1086, 1093 (9th Cir. 
2012) (nearly five days of jury deliberations); Dugas, 428 F.3d 
at 335 (three days); Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 829 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (two days); Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 
938 (9th Cir. 2001) (nearly two days at the penalty 
phase); Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 968 (9th Cir. 
2001) (over two days); Bubar, 567 F.2d at 202 (three days); 
Dallago, 427 F.2d at 559 (five days); Osborne, 351 F.2d at 118 
(two days).  
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Faced with a lack of overwhelming inculpatory 
evidence against Johnson, and significant credibility issues 
with the prosecution’s key witnesses, the jury struggled for six 
days to reach a unanimous verdict against Johnson.  The jury 
sought guidance from the trial judge and grappled with what to 
do about Wright’s inculpatory confession, which they could 
not unhear. As the evidence balanced on a knife’s edge before 
the jury, we believe that Wright’s confession “unfairly 
infect[ed]” jury deliberations.  Adamson, 633 F.3d at 261.  
Wright’s confession, when viewed in tandem with Dion and 
Taylor’s less-than-credible testimony, eliminated the space for 
reasonable doubt in the jurors’ minds.  In such situations, it is 
incumbent upon courts to protect defendants against the 
devastating effects of these egregious errors.  Indeed, “[i]t was 
against such threats to a fair trial that the Confrontation Clause 
was directed.”  Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136.  Accordingly, Johnson 
is entitled to habeas relief. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
 For the reasons above, we will reverse the order of the 
District Court and remand the case to that court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  The District Court 
should grant Johnson’s habeas petition and order that the state 
authorities free Johnson from custody unless he is retried 
within a time fixed by the District Court. 
